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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs reply brief fails to demonstrate any error in the district court's ruling 
that her claims are barred by statutes of limitation. Moreover, plaintiff fails to justify the 
ex parte interview with defendant Gladys Carling. 
Plaintiff attempts to invoke the discovery rule by referring to her supposed 
discovery of incapacity in 1990; however, she has failed to satisfy the threshold showing 
of no possible cause of action based on duress in 1967. Plaintiff argues that she had no 
right to revoke her consent based on mere "sorrow and remorse" (PL Rep. Br. 9), which is 
true, but plaintiff now openly asserts that her "ostensible consent" was obtained against 
her will, and that she "knowingly released her son" for adoption only under pressure from 
the Church (id. at 5-6). These assertions form the very essence of a claim for revocation 
based on duress. SeeAnnot, "What Constitutes 'Duress' In Obtaining Parent's Consent 
to Adoption of Child or Surrender of Child to Adoption Agency," 74 A.L.R.Srd 527 §§ 
3-4 (1976). Therefore, plaintiff had a duress cause of action in 1967 and cannot now 
invoke the discovery rule, based on discovery of a different legal theory, to toll the 
statute of limitations. 
Plaintiff has also failed to refute the alternative grounds for summary judgment. 
Her claim that a 26-year delay in filing this action is not unreasonable, and that 
defendants are not prejudiced by that delay, is contrary to both the record and reason. 
Regarding damages, plaintiff now seeks rescission of the adoption contract, with recovery 
for loss of economic benefits and companionship. (PL Rep. Br. 17-19.) However, the 
district court dismissed plaintiffs rescission claim in its November 1993 ruling, and 
plaintiff asserted no claim for rescission or economic loss in her amended complaint. 
Moreover, plaintiff has no right to recover for loss of filial consortium. See Boucher v. 
Dixie Medical Center, 850 P.2d 1179, 1183-87 (Utah 1992). As for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, this Court can conclude as a matter of law that the Agency's 
conduct was not "outrageous," as defined in the case law. {See Br. of Aplees. 22-23.) 
Finally, plaintiffs argument that she could not ratify the adoption consent because it was 
void must also fail (PI. Rep0 Br. 14-17); a contract entered while incapacitated is not void, 
but merely voidable. Smith v. Williamson, 30 P. 753 (Utah 1892). 
Regarding the cross-appeal, plaintiff argues that the issue pertaining to ex parte 
contact with Gladys Carling is moot, and that, in any event, the contact was permitted by 
Rule 4.2, Utah R. Prof. Conduct. (PL Rep. Br. 19-23.) However, even if moot, this Court 
should address the issue because it affects important interests of the public and the bar, 
the conduct is likely to recur if not corrected, and the issue is capable of evading judicial 
review. On the merits of the issue, this Court should construe Rule 4.2 to prohibit ex 
parte contact with a party or former employee whose conduct is the very subject of the 
action and is imputed to the former employer for purposes of liability. l 
1
 Plaintiffs reply brief contains no argument or mention of the district court's denial of a second amended 
complaint. Therefore, plaintiff must be deemed to have abandoned that claim. E.g., Dillingham Commercial Co. v. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE EX PARTE CONTACT 
WITH DEFENDANT CARLING IN ORDER TO PROVIDE CLEAR 
GUIDANCE TO THE PUBLIC AND THE BAR ON THE PROPER 
APPLICATION OF RULE 4.2, UTAH R. PROF. CONDUCT. 
A. Mootness—Exception. 
Plaintiff argues that the issue of the ex parte interview with Gladys Carling should 
be disregarded as moot. (PL Rep. Br. 20-21.) However, plaintiff does not dispute the 
continuing importance of the issue to the public and the bar; nor does plaintiff question 
the case law permitting this Court to address the issue on that basis, where the issue is 
likely to recur and is capable of evading judicial review. (Br. of Aplees. 26-27.) See, 
e.g., Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413,415 (Utah App. 1987) (addressing standards for 
license revocation for driving under the influence of alcohol even though the license 
suspension at issue had expired); Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1981) 
(addressing legality of jail conditions even though the petitioner was no longer detained). 
Here, the public and the bar have a great interest in knowing when lawyers can properly 
interview other parties or persons outside the presence of opposing counsel. The issue 
arises frequently in litigation throughout the state, yet the issue evades judicial review 
because it typically occurs during pretrial discovery without becoming the subject of a 
Spears, 641 P.2d 1, 9 n.14 (Alas. 1982); Urban Expansion, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 592 S.W.2d 239, 241 
n.l(Mo.App. 1979). 
3 
subsequent court order. In fact, no reported Utah case has yet addressed the proper 
application and enforcement of Rule 4.2. Accordingly, this Court should address the 
issue in this case. 
Bo Analysis of Rule 4,2, 
As set forth in defendants' opening brief, Rule 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from 
communicating about the subject of litigation with a party who is represented by another 
lawyer. (Br. of Aplees. 27; Add. 12.) The clear purposes of the rule are to preserve the 
proper functioning of the legal system, and to prevent the trained lawyer from extracting 
damaging concessions from the unshielded layman. Thus, the rule preserves the right of 
persons to legal counsel by preventing improper approaches and overreaching outside the 
presence of opposing counsel. As observed in ABA Formal Opinion 91-359 (Mar. 22, 
1991), "The profession has traditionally considered that the presumptively superior skills 
of the trained advocate should not be matched against those of one not trained in the law/' 
Plaintiffs counsel violated this rule under three alternative applications. 
1. First, Gladys Carling is a represented party to this action. Plaintiff claims 
Carling is not a party because she is no longer employed by the Agency. (PI. Rep. Br. 20.) 
However, the fact that Carling is now retired does not necessarily mean she is not a party. 
It was plaintiff who designated as a "Doe" defendant the Agency employee who took her 
adoption consent. (Amend. Comp. ffl[ 4 and 20.) In fact, plaintiff refers to Carling when 
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alleging that "Defendants saw plaintiffs physical condition." (Id., f 23, emp. added; see 
App. Br, 20.) Moreover, Carting's single act of taking plaintiffs adoption consent is the 
sole subject matter of this litigation. Therefore, Carling must be considered a "party" for 
purposes of enforcing Rule 4.2. As such, opposing counsel's ex parte interview with 
Carling was prohibited by the express terms of the rule. 
2, Second, even if Gladys Carling is not a party, the ex parte contact was 
improper because Carling was represented by counsel for defendants. The final paragraph 
of the official comment to Rule 4.2 states: 
This Rule also covers any person, whether or not a party to a formal 
proceeding, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter in question. 
Gladys Carling testified in her second affidavit, paragraph 3, dated May 9, 1996 (R. 325), 
that she is represented in this action by counsel for defendants. In fact, counsel for 
defendants met with Carling to discuss defense of the case on August 2, 1995. (Id., f 4.) 
When plaintiffs counsel subsequently met with Carling, on April 8, 1996, Carling 
informed him that she had discussed defense of the case with counsel for defendants. (Id., 
*J 5.) Nevertheless, plaintiffs counsel proceeded to interrogate Carling for the purpose of 
procuring an affidavit, which was ultimately obtained and filed in this action. (Id., fflf 6-8.) 
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Accordingly, plaintiffs counsel violated Rule 4.2 even if Carling is not considered a 
formal party to this action.2 
3. Third, even if Gladys Carling were neither a party nor represented by defense 
counsel, the proscriptions of Rule 4.2 still apply to her as a former employee whose 
conduct is imputed to the Agency for purposes of liability. The comment to the rule states 
that, "In the case of an organization,... this Rule prohibits communications . . . with any 
other person whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the 
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability." Thus, the comment applies to 
"any other person" whose conduct may be imputed to the party defendant, without 
distinction as to current or former employee. As explained in Public Service Elec. and 
Gas Co. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Services, 745 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (D.N.J. 1990), 
Rule 4.2 should also apply to former employees whose conduct is at issue, because their 
conduct can be legally imputed to the former employer to the same degree as that of 
current employees. Accordingly, the same policy reasons for preventing overreaching 
and extraction of unguarded admissions applies to former as well as current employees. In 
2
 Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, on which the Utah rule is based, was amended in 
August 1995 to substitute the term "person" for "party." As explained in Appendix A to the amendments, the 
purpose of the amendment is "to make clear that Rule 4.2 applies to contacts with represented persons whether or 
not they are, in a formal sense, actual or prospective 'parties' to a proceeding or a transaction.... The amendment 
addresses the need to protect represented persons from possible overreaching by a trained advocate who represents 
differing or potentially differing interests." Moreover, as set forth in comment 5 to the amended rule, knowledge 
that a person is represented "may be inferred from the circumstances. Such an inference may arise in circumstances 
where there is substantial reason to believe that the person with whom communication is sought is represented in the 
matter to be discussed. Thus, a lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing 
eyes to the obvious." (Emp. added.) 
6 
addition to the cases cited in defendants' opening brief, pages 28-29, see PPG Industries, 
Inc. v. BASF Corp., 134 F.R.D. 118, 121 (D. Pa, 1990) (prohibition of Rule 4.2 "plainly 
may apply to present or former employees of the corporate party" if their acts may be 
imputed to the corporation for purposes of liability); Porter v. ARCO Metals Co., 642 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1118 (D, Mont, 1986) (forbidding ex parte contact with former employees 
who had managerial responsibilities). 
Plaintiff cites Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 F.R.D, 412 (D. 
Utah 1991), for the proposition that Rule 4.2 does not apply to any former employees, 
regardless of their prior position or involvement in the subject matter of the litigation. 
However, under its own rules of professional conduct, the federal court is free to adopt its 
own interpretation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Id. at 414, The Shearson 
court, after reviewing the conflicting cases and positions on the issue, without any 
independent analysis, simply chose to follow the ABA Formal Opinion 91-359, which 
interpreted the rule narrowly as applying only to current employees. The drafters of the 
ABA Opinion recognized "that persuasive policy arguments can be and have been made 
for extending the ambit of Model Rule 4.2 to cover some former corporate employers 
[sic]/' but concluded that the text of the rule could not support that conclusion 139 
F.R.D., at 417. However, this Court is not bound by the interpretation of Rule 4.2 in 
Shearson or the ABA Opinion, but is free to adopt its own conclusions, consistent with 
7 
Utah policy and the better reasoned decisions of other courts, such as those cited above. 
See, e.g., Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Utah 1988) 
(state court should not rely on federal court's interpretation of rules of professional 
conduct, but should provide independent review); Beal v. Turner, 454 P02d 624, 625 (Utah 
1969) (state court is not bound by federal court's interpretation of state law)„ 
This Court should interpret Rule 4.2, consistent with the language of the comment, 
as applying to any person whose act or omission may be imputed to the defendant 
organization for purposes of liability. The importance of preventing overreaching and 
extraction of unguarded comments is just as important for a former manager or employee 
as for a current manager or employee when that person's conduct is at issue in the 
litigation. For example, if an employee sues the employer for wrongful discharge by the 
manager, the manager's testimony can be just as damaging to the employer whether he is 
still employed or no longer employed. See PPG Industries, supra, 134 F.R.D. at 121. 
Accordingly, the presence of defense counsel is just as vital, regardless of the manager's 
current employment status. To strip the employer of the protection of legal counsel upon 
the departure of the manager is unfair to the employer and defeats the very purpose of the 
rule. The same reason for shielding the manager during his employment applies after his 
employment, i.e., his conduct is imputable to the employer for purposes of liability. 
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The same holds true in this case with Gladys Carling. Her single act of taking 
plaintiffs adoption consent is the entire subject matter of this case. The entire focus of the 
amended complaint and plaintiffs legal arguments is to impute Carling's conduct to the 
Agency for the purpose of holding the Agency liable for that conduct. Accordingly, 
Carling's recollection and testimony of the facts could very well determine the Agency's 
liability,, Given the unavoidable impact of that testimony on the Agency's potential 
liability, fairness demands that Agency counsel be present during any questioning by 
plaintiffs counsel. The need to protect Carling from overreaching by plaintiffs counsel is 
just the same as if she were still employed by the Agency. Therefore, this Court should 
interpret Rule 4.2 to prohibit ex parte contact with any employee, whether current or 
former, whose conduct is imputed to the employer. The proper dichotomy for application 
of the rule should not be drawn between current and former employees, as simplisticly 
concluded in Shearson, but between employees, whether current or former, whose conduct 
is imputed to the employer, and those whose personal conduct is not at issue. 
Enforcement of the rule is even more important in this case because of the fact that 
defense counsel had discussed defense strategy with Carling prior to the contacts by 
plaintiffs counsel, presenting the likelihood that confidential information was extracted by 
plaintiffs counsel, in violation of Rule 4.4, regarding respect for the legal rights of third 
persons. Moreover, there has been no showing in this case that plaintiffs counsel 
9 
complied with the requirements of Rule 4.3, dealing with proper disclosures and 
safeguards when contacting laypersons. See Shearson, supra, at 417-18. Accordingly, 
this Court should rule the ex parte contacts improper. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the summary judgment in favor of 
defendants, and augment the ruling to strike the Carling affidavit obtained by plaintiffs 
counsel, and to impose appropriate sanctions against plaintiffs counsel for his repeated ex 
parte contacts. 
Respectfully submitted this f±± day of May, 1997. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: ^^^C^^Sg *?<*J2*^ 
David M. McConkie 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees/ 
Cross-Appellants 
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